ABSTRACT: At the dawn of the new millenium, the European continent faces some of its greatest challenges in decades, from the economic to the social and political. The task of addressing and meeting these challenges falls mostly on the shoulders of Europe's administrative elite - those who have the educational, technical and legal capabilities to solve the problematic issues facing Europe today. This study examines the role of administrative elites in European government and society, and the identification of several challenges that can be addressed by these same elites.

Key words: Administrative Elites, Europe, Minorities, Nationalism, Political Integration


Anahtar sözcükler: İdari elit, Avrupa, Azınlıklar, Milliyetçilik, Siyasi Birleşme
Among the people of Europe, a deepening sense of crisis has been found at the beginning of the 21st Century as ethnic and religious tensions mount, as unemployment rises and economies stagnate, as mass movements of people increase, and as threats of terrorism and violence escalate. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Empire, Europe has experienced political, social and economic upheaval, focused mostly in Central and Eastern Europe, but nonetheless felt throughout Western Europe as well. The unification of Germany, the separation of the Czech and Slovak Republics, the continued Balkan instability, the on-again-off-again efforts at further integration of the European Union, and a stagnating European economy all acted as indicators in the 1990s of the enormous sea change that had engulfed Europe. The relative stability experienced by Europe after the Second World War, a result of Cold War politics and a rapidly expanding European economy, no longer existed as Europe looked to the new millennium.

While most Europeans are aware of the crises that threaten to disrupt their lives, they as individuals shoulder little responsibility, outside of electoral prerogatives, in finding solutions to the impending predicaments. Those to whom the daunting task of managing the woes of Europe falls upon are the administrative elites within the European states and European-wide governmental organizations. Although it is true that in the world today the influence of business and nongovernmental organizations has increased, governmental institutions within the context of the “nation-state” remain the primary form in managing state relations and the main force in policy initiation and utilization. Central to European governments are the administrative institutions established by individual states’ constitutional requirements or by patterns of behavior acted out over time (e.g., British common law). European-wide institutions maintain a secondary, but steadily increasing, role in decision-making processes. Within this framework of European institutionalism work the administrative elites. Administrative elites are those, according to John A. Armstrong, who direct the administrative institutions, the individuals ultimately responsible for policy formation and implementation (Armstrong, 1973, p.3).

Defining Administrative Elites

As described by Armstrong, defining administrative elites, or even elites in general, can be a somewhat difficult task. How do you identify those individuals in positions of authority that could be considered "elite?" How do administrative elites differ from organizational and bureaucratic elites, if they differ at all? How can you separate bureaucracy from administration? Kenneth Farmer states that elites are those who possess "some characteristic highly valued by the community." (Farmer, 1992:1). In general, the issue of elite definition depends primarily upon the institutional perspective of social and governmental structures.

A structural approach assumes that the political and social institutions of a society play a predominant role in determining the development of societal goals, while the free will of humans is comparatively irrelevant (Farmer, 1992:7). Structuralists thus focus on the office rather than the individual holding the office. For structuralists,
individual holding a particular position within the institutional hierarchy of a state becomes a member of the elite, regardless of his contributions to policy formation. While this may be somewhat deterministic, it is important to remember that human volition is not denied, rather it is subordinated to the institutional structures. A functionalist approach, on the other hand, sees the role played by the individual holding office as the defining factor in a society. State and social structures exist but it is the actors within these structures who guide the development of state doctrine. Accordingly, individuals within institutional structures who contribute to the formation of state and social policy are identified as members of the elite.

The position of elite identification taken by this study is, broadly, a combination of both the structural and functional approaches, reflecting the implicit views taken in several analyses of administrative and bureaucratic elites. In these analyses can be found the combined characteristics of both structural and functional approaches, although the position cannot be classified as the archetypal structural-functionalist approach. While granting that an office within the administrative structure can be institutionally influential independent of the individual holding that position, this study assumes that such an individual in a position of administrative authority would not have achieved this office without the proper personal qualifications.

Outside of broad theoretical statements, a more explicit understanding is required if the nature of the role of administrative elites in addressing challenges to Europe and the European states is to be understood. According to Armstrong, a popular distinction between elites is made as part of a disciplinary bias. Political scientists, in general, prefer the use of "administration" to refer to the "formally nonpolitical activities of government," while sociologists look at the same phenomena as "bureaucratic." (Armstrong, 1973:6). For Farmer, one method of identifying administrative elites are those who possess "power," which is defined as the relative freedom from structural constraint (Farmer, 1992:7). Other definitions include those appointed to high public office or those born to fill administrative roles. Despite a seeming lack of consensus within the field of political science, a definition of administrative elites can be culled from scholarly writings. In essence, what distinguishes administrative elites from other types of elites such as bureaucratic and political elites is determined by the combination of a number of characteristics, including education, socialization, family history, recruitment, elite-society relations, and role definition within the institutional framework of any given state and society.

Beginning with education, in any number of European states, most of those who fill administrative elite positions within the governing institutions have had access to higher or special educational facilities, primarily in the form of universities, colleges, or special training schools (Aberbach, 1981:47). Rank and privilege in most states of Europe is partially determined even today by educational background, and this value is reflected by administrative elites and the institutions they lead. In the formerly socialist states of Europe, the educational system prior to the collapse of communism was more stringent, in effect indoctrinating and grooming the future.
administrative elites. As an example, before the disintegration of the Soviet Union, most individuals preparing for administrative posts within Soviet government attended some higher institution prior to joining administrative offices. In such a system as the Soviet state established it was understood that to rise in the ranks of privileged administrators, one needed also to attend special party schools for Marxist-Leninist indoctrination, in addition to schools of higher education (Farmer, 1992:54, 58-61).

After the collapse of the Soviet bloc, this party education and indoctrination of course ended. However, articles and exposés in the public media have indicated that eastern Europeans are now joining their western counterparts and applying a time-honored strategy in educating and employing their elites. For centuries, the primary method of obtaining first, an appropriate education, and second, an appropriate occupation was through family ties. Historically, sons and nephews of well-placed individuals found access to the halls of the proper educational institutions through their family connections. Later, these connections led to desirable jobs in positions of authority. A classic example is Alexis de Tocqueville, a son of a minor aristocrat, who was able to parlay his education and social status into a moderately famous tour of the United States and a position as a magistrate (Tocqueville, 1981:xx-xxiv). While Tocqueville's case is somewhat dated, it nonetheless demonstrates, historically, the role of family in obtaining high administrative positions. Even today it is acknowledged that influence-peddling, particularly of the familial variety, provides rare opportunities for advancement in education and in professional fields.

According to Armstrong, however, the variety of familial influence, education, and socialization within a European context is different than that found in the United States. European family connections are much closer on an intergenerational level, but remain more professional and businesslike than the American counterpart. The goal of placing a son or daughter in a high administrative post is to further the interests and historical prestige of the family, not a concern for the child's individual welfare. As noted by Armstrong, in Great Britain, "upper-class parents and children have been on visiting terms since Tudor days, with servants acting as foster parents," and boarding school becoming a surrogate home after early education (Armstrong, 1973: 97, 105-107). This similar phenomenon is found in a number of other European states as well. School and schooling consequently becomes an important factor in the training and socialization of administrative elites. Combined with familial ties and family history, the path to the heights of administrative institutions becomes more navigable.

Yet the process for achieving administrative elite status is not ended with the proper education, family history, and socialization. Also important is the recruitment process, elite-society relations, and role definition, the more theoretical aspects of establishing elite authority. After suitable schooling and childhood socialization, it is still possible for a number of young Europeans to fail in achieving administrative posts. This is due mostly to recruitment systems of various institutional structures.
The primary method in the recruitment of European administrative elites is ascriptive in nature, in effect utilizing upper-class children, and particularly boys, as the main source of recruits (Armstrong, 1973:73). This holds true for most European states, with the notable exception of the former Soviet Union. Seventy years of communist rule lead to an administrative elite that, by the early 1970s, was characterized as primarily peasant, with a strong working class presence (Armstrong, 1973:74). Only a decade since the collapse of the Soviet regime, we can see the Russian Federation adapting itself to the realities of West European government, as technically and educationally sophisticated individuals take places within the hierarchy of Russian government (Savvateyeva, 1994:8-9). Certainly it is the case that in a number of former Soviet satellite states, members of social, cultural, or economic elites have obtained high positions in government organizations.

In the modern world, the organization of state and society has become technical and functional in nature (see notation'). The organizational structure of a state and social unit "develops some division of labor, assigning responsibility for coordination to a small group." (Putnam, 1976:135). This leadership group (i.e., elite group) inadvertently begins to develop special skills and contacts, and begins to monopolize the control of information, thus acquiring power over other groups. To perpetuate its leading role, the elite group must transform this "coercive" power into willing obedience by the masses. It does so by developing and disseminating state and social doctrines that are accepted by the society (Armstrong, 1973:48, Putnam, 1976:136). While this is an endeavor that is made by all elites, administrative elites are particularly influential in the dispersion of what Armstrong labels "development doctrines," due to their ability to influence the technical aspects of government policy (Armstrong, 1973:47). With care, the distribution of the proper development doctrine ensures a relationship between the administrative elites and the masses that protects the role of the elite administrators within the state and social system. In addition, a favorable development doctrine (e.g., one that is not rejected by society) leads to a passive role definition, indicating that the elite administrator understands his role as non-interventionist (Armstrong, 1973:19, 49). Whereas an active role definition might foster resentment in the public for perceived nondemocratic control, a perception of passive involvement leads to further acceptance by the masses and increased recruitment capabilities.

Introducing an acceptable development doctrine into a society creates the framework for establishing an administrative elite. Following up the dispersion of the doctrine with appropriate role definition and the necessary recruitment process further reinforces the leading role of administrative elites within a state structure. Through a process of socialization, education, and familial influence a "class" of citizen emerges with the ability and the authority to make administrative judgments and policy choices, and address challenges to the state. Yet, how are challenges to the state identified and defined? The following sections attempt to answer this question.
In the early 1990s, at a meeting held to prepare a world summit, participants were asked to "brainstorm" and create a list of possible "shocks," or unexpected crises and events, that would be likely to occur within the following ten years. The participants' responses to the brainstorming session highlight one of the significant problems for administrative elites and others in positions of authority. Of the crises listed, only two of twenty had any overlap in support between participating states (Jacquemin and Wright, 1993:5). This demonstrates that although there exists numerous problems and crises needing resolution, there is often little agreement as to what are the important issues and what the priorities of European-wide institutions should be. Individual and group elites representing different administrative institutions will naturally have different priorities and agendas. Thus what is of important immediate concern for one elite cadre may be completely irrelevant to others.

In addition to having difficulty in identifying salient challenges, there exists the possibility that some of these crises cannot be easily solved, if at all, by administrative elites. To a certain extent, the role of administrative elites, while influencing cultural patterns, is normally understood within the context of governmental/political, economic, and to a lesser extent, social functions. Of the many problems that confront Europe as it passes the turn of the century, there are those that fall outside the direct purview of administrative elites. Such a potential problem as an extreme cultural and/or social trauma might induce, be it the growth of religious sentiment, the rise of alternative social movements or other phenomena, is not necessarily the direct responsibility of the administrative elites, nor should they necessarily be able to address such concerns. This is not to submit that the work of administrative elites has no value outside traditional governmental concerns, nor that their work does not influence and is influenced by society and culture. As both Armstrong and Farmer indicate, educational and social experience instill within administrative elites a role perception that "represents learned responses to social stimuli." (Armstrong, 1973:7). However, in the end, administrative elites are limited by the resources available to them, their own training and education, and the mandates of their positions. Administrative elites function within a governmental institutional structure where their responsibilities include guiding the formation and implementation of policy necessary for the state to function, not single-handedly solving the ills of a society.

For the benefit of limiting the focus of this study, a methodology has been selected that will distinguish European challenges that can be addressed by administrative elites from challenges and crises that are not directly related to administrative elites' roles or positions. In his work, The European Administrative Elite, Armstrong conducted an "exploratory study" of administrative elites in four European states. In addressing challenges that administrative elites faced and how they responded to crises, Armstrong created a framework for the identification of such challenges, one that would determine the saliency of these crises by the possession of four characteristics. First, each challenge must have been a problem of great magnitude...
for all four states in the study. Second, the allocation and mobilization of resources should have been salient. Third, there must have been a strong potential for administrative intervention in solving the challenge. Finally, the "inherent physical properties of the challenge or its locus in time must [have been] sharply delimited." Armstrong, for the benefit of his specific study, added an additional practical element, that the challenge must have been sufficiently discussed (Armstrong, 1973:275). Since Armstrong chose to focus his study on the special relationship between administrative elite mobilization and economic development, there were limited challenges that met his methodological requirements (Armstrong, 1973:4).

This study will take a broader scope to include social and political challenges as well as economic crises, while still attempting to limit the search for challenges that meet Armstrong's methodological standards. Increasing search parameters does not conflict with any of Armstrong's four criteria. More than twenty years after his classic work, world dynamics are significantly different than those of the late 1960s and early 1970s. The growth in communications and other technologies, the increased capability to travel, and the rise in multinational corporations conducting transnational business has brought political, social, and economic events in separate parts of the world into close proximity. War in the Balkans had a profound effect outside of the Balkan Peninsula. Repercussions from the unification of Germany and the collapse of the Soviet Empire are felt around the world still today, a decade after they happened.

In one sense, economics plays a central role in much of what occurs, as the German reunification example demonstrates. In addition to the political and social aspects of reunification, economically that act created the largest single market within Europe and virtually guaranteed Germany's leadership role in the European Union. What remains of Armstrong's framework is to determine the potential for administrative action and participation. Naturally, a broader base such as described will, of necessity, sacrifice some of the detailed analysis of Armstrong's study. However, the goal of this current research is to examine the challenges faced by administrative elites in the new millennium and beyond, not to reexamine a definitive work on the subject of administrative elites and their economic influences.

The salience and relevance of Armstrong's framework to this study becomes obvious when utilizing his methodology and applying it to the Europe of the new millennium. The number of crises and challenges that must be faced by administrative elites in each of the individual European states and within European-wide institutions become clearly delimited and well defined. A brief survey of the condition of Europe today reveals that significant challenges faces individual state administrative elites and that many of these crises are shared among a number of the European states. Reviewing scholarly literature, reading world news reports, watching international news programs, and examining governmental activities all provide good indicators as to what issues and problems concern the governments and peoples of Europe. Briefly, those that are found to be most universal in nature include the rise of nationalist fervor and the related growth of ethnic violence,
minority rights, migration, and the increasing integration of political, economic, and social institutions. The next section examines each of these issues to determine how well they fit into Armstrong’s methodological framework.

**Defining Challenges to Administrative Elites**

**Nationalism and Ethnic Violence**

Several of the most immediate crises facing a number of European states are closely related and include the problems of resurgent nationalism and corresponding ethnic violence. A prime indicator of the severe nature of these several problems is the series of conflicts in the former Yugoslavia that occupied much time in the 1990s. While the Yugoslav conflicts can be identified as crisis points for European states and Europe as a whole, do the issues they represented provide a genuine challenge to the European administrative elites based on Armstrong’s methodological framework? Certainly nationalist tension is an important issue in any of the increasingly diverse European societies. In the Europe of the 1990s nationalism and minority rights became flashpoints of crises from Northern Ireland to Spain, Germany, and throughout central and Eastern Europe. One primary cause in the rise of nationalist and ethnic tension, and bringing the “problems of minorities in Europe into sharp prominence” was the collapse of communism throughout Eastern Europe (Hobsbawn, 1990:163). With communism no longer a binding force on the peoples of Eastern Europe, newly elected “democratic” governments relied on appeals to the national majorities within their societies to help them consolidate state authority.

For most of the former Soviet satellite states of eastern and central Europe, the purpose of their governments has been to serve the needs of the new nations and their citizens, primarily identified as the dominant majority (Pajic, 1994:65). This focus aggravates the problem of minority rights by ignoring the minority constituents. In doing so, the new governments of eastern Europe subsume the rights of the minorities to those of the majority, a potentially dangerous situation that could lead to the growth of resentment by national minorities and foment nationalist, ethnic, and minority violence. The cases of Bosnia-Hercegovina and Kosovo were extreme example of this, with ethnic cleansing a fact of life, sponsored by a rump state that had collapsed around its nationalist constituency. Yet in the East, Yugoslavia has not been the only example of rising nationalist tension. In western Romania and the Slovak Republic, ethnic Hungarians experience discrimination and other minority abuses on a daily basis, from the outlawing of their national tongue to the confiscation of property. Turkish minorities in most Balkan and central European states face housing, linguistic, and employment discrimination. East European and Balkan gypsies encounter much the same discrimination as the Turks, with children required to study in the majority language and constant attacks on their unique culture a grim reality. Albanians are not left out when confronted with hostility and violence in a number of former Yugoslav republics, Kosovo being only the most recent example (Gurr, 1993:181, 196, 205, 3280).
Western Europe also has not been able to escape the increasingly fractious nationalist elements that afflict the central and eastern sectors of the continent. The historically singular "nation-states" founded in the aftermath of the American and French Revolutions over time developed legal-institutional structures that reflected the cultural dominance of the majority nationality within each state. This has led to a so-called "crisis of national consciousness," with minority groups questioning the cultural, legal, and institutional dominance of the majority nationality (Hobsbawm, 1990: 18-20, 22, 188). Older minority groups that have been living in relative calm within the existing institutional structures have been experiencing cultural reawakening and are reevaluating their roles in the current state and social structures. While to date protest is favored over open rebellion, the demands of such nationalist minority groups as the Bretons, Frisians, Galicians, Basques, and Irish are steadily mounting as discriminatory practices become too burdensome to continue accepting (Gurr, 1993: 139, 141).

The scope of the crisis of nationalism and minority rights certainly appears to fit Armstrong's criteria of the widespread nature of a challenge to administrative elites, with nationalist issues being raised from the farthest reaches of eastern Europe to the islands west of the continent. However, do the issues of nationalism, minority rights, and ethnic violence also hold true for Armstrong's other criteria? The above discussion reveals the nationalism question to fit at least one of Armstrong's other standards, that of the challenge having the physical properties or locus in time that is sharply delimited. In the East, it is not difficult to demonstrate that the collapse of communism acted as the catalyst for nationalist fervor, dating the rise of renewed nationalism to a specific period of time, 1989-1991. The return to nationalist ideology as a method of consolidating state power by very nearly all of the former communist states thus has placed the nationalist issue at a specific locus in time, while at the same time the physical properties of the challenge (ethnic violence, nationalist discrimination) become obvious and delimited.

The nationalist question in the West became a significant concern at roughly the same moment in time. It can be argued that although there exists a long history of struggle among some ethnic and nationalist groups such as the Basques of Spain and the Irish of Northern Ireland, the locus in time for the rise of nationalist tension is also limited to the later half of the 1980s and the early part of the 1990s. While it has been asserted by some scholars that the time to study a problem is when "the problems that are actual in the world today first take visible shape," the events of the last ten years have created a contemporary locus in time for the rise of nationalism in Western Europe (Barraclough, 1967: 20). Prior to the 1980s nationalist movements were primarily attempts at retaining cultural identification within a state that contained an overwhelming majority nationality. With the collapse of communism, the reunification of Germany, erratic economic prospects, and growing fears of migration, many nationalist groups passively residing in Western Europe have now, at the beginning of the new millennium, moved to reclaim what they believe is theirs by history and by legal right (Hobsbawm, 1994: 10). Reports of Welsh towns being renamed in the
Welsh language, the South Tyrolians and Bretons reaffirming cultural and territorial history, and the increased use of Catalan as a means of communication all indicate that previously acquiescent minority groups are becoming more visible in the defense of their traditional culture.

The potential for administrative elite involvement in these issue areas, another of Armstrong's four characteristics, is quite high in bringing resolutions to the challenges of nationalism and ethnic violence. The manifestation of most ethnic and nationalist demands appears primarily in the form of calls for independence or increased autonomy from the institutional structures of a state. While these types of demands are political in nature, they are not explicitly so, due to the policy oriented character of such demands and the role played by both political and administrative elites in the policy process (Aberbrach, 1981:85). Politicians, according to Aberbach, serve a broadbased constituency with ill-defined focus on matters of policy. They can make general assessments, agreements, or even concessions, but their actions lack the necessarily solid legal and institutional foundation. Administrators, on the other hand, serve a much narrow constituent base, their role being sharply defined. They are the technical experts who develop the policy foundations of political actions (Aberbrach, 1981: 90).

A decision to grant nationalist demands such as political autonomy does naturally have to be made by the political elite of a state, as often they are the nominally constitutional leaders. Yet it remains up to the administrative elites' to see that the new policy directives are implemented and fulfilled. Administrative elites' technical focus affects policy decisions in that the viability of political resolutions remains dependent on the ability of administrative elites to execute policy prescriptions. If the implementation of a policy proposal is untenable, the political decision is influenced. To simply grant a national minority autonomous or independent status may be a reasonable solution to a potentially explosive situation, yet to grant autonomy or independence requires far more than simply agreeing to the alteration of the current institutional arrangements. One of the more recent referendums on Quebec's independence from Canada, while not exactly European in nature, demonstrates the political nature of a nationalist question. Fearing the demise of their cultural and national heritage, French-speaking Canadians in the province of Quebec held the referendum in order to separate themselves from Canada. While this would be an enormous political situation, it is not one of immediate impact. According to a New York Times article, if the vote had favored independence, it would have been years before there was any real move to absolute independence (Farnsworth, 1995:3). The process of establishing independence requires significant policy changes which must be guided by administrative elites and certainly cannot be completed in a short amount of time. In the same manner, other nationalist demands with policy implications, be it conducting business and education in a national language, observing nationalist holidays, or extending the limits of sovereignty, necessarily requires the involvement of the administrative elite.

Of Armstrong's four criteria, his idea that allocation and mobilization of resources be salient is deceivingly simple. It can be argued that nationalist issues raised in each
state of Europe require the utilization of resources in solving the problem, but this does not necessarily make the use of resources salient to the challenge. To a certain extent, the use of financial, social, or political resources is a part of the daily life and routine of any governmental administrator. What is important for a challenge in meeting Armstrong's requirement is that the allocation and mobilization of resources be case specific. In the instance of resurgent nationalism and escalating ethnic violence, it can be argued that resources used to combat this challenge are salient to the crisis.

A number of states in Europe, particularly in the West, have set aside financial resources to address nationalist concerns. A case in point, educating children of national minorities in their native language is certainly not cost effective for a state with a large dominant majority. Yet this is exactly what is occurring across Europe as administrators attempt to stem the tide of rising nationalism. Another example is the increasing funding and use of inter-European organizations whose purpose it is to settle matters of conflict within and among the states of Europe. The Council of Europe has recently come into prominence as a tool for addressing nationalist concerns, as has the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) (Schumann, 1990:99). These and other organizations have utilized resources in recent years for the specific purpose of solving nationalist issues, be it the numerous conflicts in the former Yugoslavia or the education of ethnic Turks in Germany. Ultimately, while funding for the resolution of nationalist concerns is a constant, the increased saliency of nationalist issues will entail a corresponding increase in the allocation and mobilization of resources to address such considerations.

**Minority Rights**

As noted above, the issue of minority rights has been brought to prominence by the events of 1989-1991, particularly in Eastern Europe. Much of what has been said about nationalism holds true for the challenge of minority issues. From the desire to learn in a minority language to calls for autonomy in regions predominantly inhabited by minority nationalities, it is often hard to separate minority issues from nationalist issues. Efforts to rejuvenate historical or cultural ties are often ethnic in nature, focusing on shared language, common history, or kinship ties, and later developed into nationalist issues, such as the quest for self-government. The purpose of this section is to note the possible existence of cases where nationalism and minorities are separated from one another and to examine if such a case could fit into Armstrong’s crisis framework.

As has been stated, separating minority issues from nationalist questions is not an easy task. Yet it is not entirely impossible, for the simple reason that minority questions are not restricted to nationalist characteristics, nor are all nationalist issues related to minority rights. One manifestation of nationalism that has not been examined in this study is that of majoritarian nationalism. In many states of Europe there is a corresponding rise of majoritarian nationalism, in response to increased minority nationalist activity. Unfortunately, the cases of majority nationalist
expression are often tainted by increased and active discrimination rather than reaffirmation of "self-national" pride. The type of activities referred to are manifest primarily as anti-Semitic or anti-minority demonstrations, which have historical precedents dating to the late 19th century (Hobsbawm, 1990:105, 166-174). German extremists firebombing Turkish workers' hotels and ethnic dance clubs, former Soviet republics disenfranchising ethnic Russians, and the multiple ethnic conflicts in the Balkans are all grim reminders that majorities have not always treated fairly nationalist minorities.

It is well documented that minorities have often suffered at the hands of majoritarian regimes, some for several hundreds of years. Political marginalization and economic discrimination, nominally caused by systematic exclusion from access points in the political or economic arenas of a society, have prevented minority groups from fulfilling social and cultural goals (Gurr, 1993:42-43, 46-48). However, these practices are not based solely on responses to ethnicity and nationality. Two groups that are well ensconced within minority issues have little to do with questions of nationality. They are, respectively, racial minorities and religious minorities. Of these two groups the former does not appear to have become involved in issues of crises proportion, such as those examined in this study. While Europe remains predominately white, it is increasingly becoming "darker" as migration increases from Turkey, the Middle East, and former colonial holdings in the Third World. Using Armstrong's theoretical framework, the question of race does not appear to be a challenge needing the attention of administrative elites. Race questions are not a problem of great magnitude for any of the states of Europe (see notation 4), nor has there been salient allocation and mobilization of resources. While there is strong potential for administrative elite intervention, current research does not indicate that there has been an extensive elite mobilization to address issues of race, which has often been associated with national, ethnic, or immigration issues. Finally, the "inherent physical properties" of race or its locus in time have not manifested themselves. A primary cause for the failure of such a manifestation is that many of those who come to Europe are not so much defined racially as they are ethnically or nationally. Thus questions of race are subsumed to issues of nationalism.5

Religious minorities, however, are more problematic when their case is applied to Armstrong's crisis framework. Europe has historically been Christian (Catholic and Protestant) with only marginal inroads made by non-Christian peoples during the height of the Ottoman Empire and the North African occupation of the Iberian peninsula. Many of those who currently migrate to Europe in search of a better life are less often Christian and predominately Muslim, joining an increasingly active Islamic minority in a number of European states. Accompanying the increase in Islamic migration and activism is an increase in Muslim fundamentalism and terrorism (Gurr, 1993: 21, 116). The enlarged Islamic presence in Europe does certainly seem to be a challenge of great magnitude. A core component of the early 1990s crisis in Bosnia was religious, with Christian Serbs intent upon eradicating the Bosnian Muslim presence in the Balkans. For its involvement in North Africa, France has suffered numerous terrorist attacks, most claimed or attributed to
fundamentalist Islamic terrorist organizations. Even the Dutch, who are historically famous for their religious tolerance, have had difficulty with the Islamic question, as mosques and Muslim community centers are subject to defacement and vandalism. In some cases, the issue is primarily one of nationalism, as with Turkish workers in Germany. However, Arabs, North and Central Africans, Central Asians, and Pakistanis are also migrating to Europe and they too share the common thread of Islam.

The locus in time or physical properties of the Islamic question are delimited by the increased violence of and against Muslims in Europe in the 1980s and 1990s, meeting a second of Armstrong's requirements. Prior to the 1980s, violent actions taken against Muslim minorities were predominantly nationalist in nature, focusing on the country of origin rather than the religion. For the last ten years, however, the growing Islamic presence in Europe, and the increasing Islamic militantism in former colonial holdings have made many Europeans fearful of a Muslim influence in their states and societies. Some attribute the cause of conflict to be the philosophy that Muslims bring with them (which is found to be inherently incompatible with Western values), rather than the increasing numbers of Muslims who come to Europe (Gurr, 1993:250). Others claim that it is not the religion per se, but the cultural values of the countries of origin or the tendency of Islam to vest state authority on religion and nationality, again tying the issue to nationalism (Robinson, 1994: 215-216).

For whatever reason, the growing presence of Islam in European societies has become a challenge at the beginning of the new millennium. Is this a challenge that can be addressed by administrative elite, again another of Armstrong's requirements? By most appearances, the issue of a growing Islamic presence in Europe can be addressed by elite administrators. One important aspect of administrative elite authority is developing and distributing state and social doctrine (as discussed in the first section). Administrative elites have it within their ability to create, over time, a social "philosophy" through policy prescription that allows for the acceptance of Islam within European society. By altering the development doctrine of a society, elite administrators can bring about public acceptance of Islam and Muslims to a society, providing of course that social values allow for this type of adjustment. While this is not a short-term endeavor, the steps can be taken now to lay the foundations for future doctrinal adjustment.

A further possibility of elite involvement in solving the Islamic question also relates to the salient allocation and mobilization of resources, the last of Armstrong's requirements. Important to any migrant group is integration into a society. For Muslim immigrants to Europe, this has been a less than successful undertaking. For administrative elites, it is necessary to create policies that will assist Muslims in integrating into their new societies (Miller, 1995). These policies do, of course, take time and money to initiate, develop, and implement. In addition to adjusting native perspectives on the influx of Muslims, it is also necessary to educate the Muslim immigrants as to the culture and traditions of their new home, to educate them in
order to become productive members of their society, and to help them adapt to their new lives. Education might have to initially be bilingual, until recent immigrants can grasp the new language. Special dispensation may be needed for housing, religious questions, or any number of other social factors. Finally, many new Muslim immigrants face open and public hostility, at times requiring special police protection. Almost any extraordinary action taken by elite administrators to facilitate the integration of Islamic migrants into a culture will have inherent costs, and due to the growing presence of Islam in Europe, many of these costs are found to be salient allocations of available resources in determining the nature, and addressing the issues, of the Islamic challenge.

Migration

Migration is another issue, such as nationalism or minority rights, that has a long history where Europe is concerned. Traditionally a source of emigration, Europe has, in the last twenty-five years become a major source of immigration as migration patterns have changed globally (Castles and Miller, 1998: 65, 78, 81, Purcell, 1993: 216). Governments across Europe have a vested interest in migration issues and many are taking moves to address migration problems. Even some non-traditional governments are becoming involved in the debate, as even Papal speeches have demonstrated (Bohlen, 1995: 7). Yet, is there enough of a concern about the nature of migration in the Europe of the 2000 to constitute a challenge to the administrative elite? In terms of magnitude, migration is an issue that has international implications for much of Europe. Many states of Western Europe have become receiving countries for much of the world's immigrant population. Immigrants from former colonial holdings, lesser developed countries, and the former communist bloc all look to Western Europe for their futures. In addition to the favored Northern and Western European states, countries such as Italy, Greece, and Spain have also attracted a large immigration movement, particularly from Asia and Africa (Castles and Miller, 1998: 80t, 81). Even former Soviet satellite states, such as the Czech Republic and Hungary, have become destinations for those seeking new lives for themselves and their families. In a study conducted in the early 1990s to determine shaping factors for Europe in that decade and beyond, seven of twelve thinktanks participating in the study stated that migration issues were significant economic, social, and political concerns for the future (Jaquemin and Wright, 1993: 236, 289, 295, 322-323, 363, 390). Tellingly the French group noted that France was reticent in acknowledging any immigration concerns, focusing instead on the "uniqueness" of the French cultural tradition and the search for French identity, an interesting avoidance of an obvious concern (Jaquemin and Wright, 1993: 206-208). For the span of time given, it is remarkable that even today, the same concerns exist.

Whether acknowledged or not, the issue of migration does appear to be of significant magnitude to qualify it for an authentic European challenge. However, this does not necessarily make it a salient issue with regards to the nature of the challenge. Armstrong's requirement was that the challenge must have "inherent
physical properties" or a "locus in time" that is sharply delimited. Do the immigration concerns of Europe today have delimited properties or are they rather part of the ongoing development of migration, continuously shaped by changing historical factors? It can be argued that the migration problems of today are well defined and salient for this period of time. While migration is continuous and historical in nature, a number of developments have established migration as a salient challenge. One of the most significant factors has been the collapse of the Soviet bloc (Kussbach, 1992:646). As with nationalist and ethnic issues, the demise of the Soviet Union opened the floodgates of the migration issue. While some expected the flow of people from Eastern Europe to come to an end, the opposite proved true. The reasons for leaving the former Soviet and Soviet satellite states are manifold, primary among them economic instability, social unrest, armed conflict, resurgent nationalism, and political unease (Kussbach, 1992: 647-650). All of these problems are not new to the issue of migration. However, the suddenness of their development can be tied directly to the collapse of the Eastern bloc, creating, at least from the East European perspective, a specific locus in time and inherent physical properties that are salient for European administrative elites.

Outside of East-West issues the migration question is not so clearly delimited. Economic productivity, aging populations, and low birthrates in industrialised Western Europe, some of the traditional sources of the need for immigrant populations (as a disposable workforce), have become less viable factors with regards to the migration issue. While older populations and lower birthrates still afflict European states, they have, to a certain extent, been countered by industrial modernization, slow economic growth, and previous migrations. The times when hundreds of thousands of "gastarbeiter" were needed and allowed into Germany have been replaced by a period of economic uncertainty and rising hostility towards foreign workers. Still, evaluation of global migratory movements since 1973 clearly demonstrate that Europe remains a preeminent destination for those seeking a new life in a foreign country (Castles and Miller, 1998:6m).

In the past fifteen years or so, the type of immigration has also changed. Historically, migration of single adults into Europe for economic and labor reasons was the norm. Since the 1980s the focus has shifted to "finding the right balance between worker and family migrations," as well as the prevention of illegal migration. In most Western European states today, the basis for legal immigration falls under family reunification criteria (Castles and Miller, 1998:88-89). This has a significant effect on immigration patterns to Europe in that not only are non-working relatives allowed in, but relatives capable of holding work as well.

In terms of the ability of administrative elites to address the migration challenge, the question is nearly moot. Administrative elites, as the guardians of state policy, are almost solely responsible for the technical application of policy. While there are the necessary and obvious political concerns over migration issues, the burden of solving the migration challenges lies almost exclusively with elite administrators. They are responsible for formulating and implementing migration policies.
determining the parameters for legal entry into a state, and developing strategies for the prevention of illegal immigration. James Purcell sees the current migration dilemma in Europe, and around the world, as reflecting "the absence of...policy measures or mechanisms to address migration pressures," which falls under the mandate of elite administrators in a state and European-wide context (Purcell, 1993:217-218). While individual states may develop migration controls, in the Europe of the 21st Century, a more integrated European system, with open internal borders and the free flow of goods, services, and workers, necessitates the creation of a pan-European migration program and strategy, further attesting to both the scope of the migration challenge and the necessary involvement of administrative elites (Castles and Miller, 1998:269-270). The real challenge to administrative elites in solving the migration dilemma is to develop policy approaches that are equitable to all parties involved, including sending and receiving states, but most importantly to the immigrants and their families.

Identifying the allocation and mobilization of resources as a salient component of the migration dilemma proves to be somewhat difficult for the simple fact that most of the allocation of resources towards migratory control is a continuous activity. Monitoring borders for illegal entry, verifying citizenship or status for work-related concerns, or updating and reviewing citizenship and immigration policies are historic enterprises on the part of state bureaucratic and administrative structures. Proving unequivocally that the allocation of resources in the 1990s was any different than that of previous decades would take a great deal of fiscal investigation to verify. However, a simpler approach may suffice. In many instances, the allocation and mobilization of resources occurs as administrative elites implement policies designed to solve problems of great magnitude. Therefore, it would not be unreasonable to conjecture that the increasing awareness of the migration dilemma by administrative elites, and their attempts to solve this problem, is accompanied by an increased mobilization of resources for the implementation of migratory control policies. Repatriation, intensified verification, updating legalization procedures, and increased border monitoring all include the increased use of fiscal, social, and political resources.

**Political, Social, and Economic Integration**

In terms of Armstrong's methodology, the issue of whether or not the political, social, and economic integration of Europe represents a challenge to the administrative elite could not be simpler. Begun in the 1950s, stagnating in the 1970s, and reemerging in the 1980s, only to stall once again at the millennium, there is great concern over the nature of this challenge. With consideration to its scope alone, integration is obviously European-wide. By basic definition the nature of European integration as a challenge must represent a concern of great magnitude. It involves, at its core, the European Union (EU), EU associate states, and the European Free Trade Association states (EFTA), all of which include nearly every country in western and central Europe, as well as Scandinavia. In the thinktank project mentioned above, every single group involved listed the integration process
as the single most pressing concern of the 1990s and beyond (Ross, 1995:1). The possibility that a state would not have a vested interest in the terms of integration is marginal. Even states which do not belong to any of the above organizations, such as the Russian Federation, still have concerns that need to be addressed with respect to the challenge of integration.

The potential for administrative involvement in solving the challenge and the salient allocation and mobilization of resources also require little evidence. As with the scope of the integration challenge, the ability of administrative elites to become involved in the solution to the problem is expected considering the nature of the dilemma. Throughout the history of European integration, administrative elites, represented by such individuals as Jean Monnet and Jacques Delors, have been the responsible architects of policies designed to facilitate the process. Although there is a great deal of political involvement in the process of integration, the details of integration fall to the technical experts who, as discussed in the first section, are responsible for the implementation of policy. Between 1992 and 1999, the integration process stalled, leaving Europe in the midst of an unfinished conversion (Ross, 1992:2-4). The introduction of the Euro in 1999 was thought to help jumpstart the process again, but its poor performance in the two years since its introduction, has done little to alleviate the concerns of a number of EU member states. In such a time, the role of the administrative elites is of great importance in adjusting policies between and among the various states so that the integration process can move forward.

Integrating all three spheres into a single unit also requires some resource expenditure. The cost of altering political, social and economic structures both in fiscal and political terms, is a long and involved process. Add to that the desire of many of the newly liberated East European states who wish to join in on the integration venture, and the cost of accommodating their needs or proffering alternatives calls for an even greater mobilization and utilization of resources. Open borders, free movement of goods and labor, common currency, each requires resources for implementation and each places a burden on the administrative elites to allocate the resources effectively.

Demonstrating that political, social, and economic integration exists as a challenge with a specific locus in time or delimited physical properties is equally simple. While European integration began in the 1950s with the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the Atomic Energy Commission (Euratom), the European Economic Community (EEC), and continued with their merger in 1967 into the European Community (EC), the realities of European integration have not been that successful. The EC was considered a model of integration, but the fact was that disagreement and reluctance in moving toward integration led to a period of stagnation and near collapse for the EC in the 1970s (Ross, 1995:2-4, Ross, 1992:487). In the mid-1980s a process of expansion began, with the approval of the Single European Act (SEA) by the EC. The SEA provided for the continued integration of the EC and the eventually opening of borders by the end of 1992,
moving the EC from a purely economic union into one with political and social considerations as well (Ross, 1995:2). The process of growth was renewed and until 1992 was well on the way to becoming "the international beacon for humane capitalism," and a developing political influence equal to its economic capabilities. (Ross, 1992:488) Since 1992, however, with the repudiation of the "Maastricht Treaty," and the instability of the Euro, some states within Europe, most notably Great Britain, have balked at the idea of continuing this rapid pace of integration, creating a crisis point for the integration process. The recent EU Summit in Nice and its support for expansion notwithstanding, the path toward continued integration is still littered with obstacles that are a direct result of operative policy choices over the last ten years. Thus, the locus of time and the physical properties of the integration dilemma are focused on the past ten years, when, at the urging of the European Commission, efforts were made to accelerate the process.

Conclusion

Based on the methodology of this study, nationalism, ethnic questions, minority rights, migration, and the continued integration of the European Union all appear to qualify as challenges for the European administrative elites. Yet to say that these few issues are the sole problems faced by elite administrators would be naive. The work of administrative elites is to guide states and societies through both placid and turbulent times, creating policies to address the needs of the masses and promoting stable social, political, and economic environments. While the above issues are currently of significant importance, they will not always remain so. There are constant challenges waiting in the wings, some are on the verge of international significance, while others may be as yet regional in nature. Issues of race, aging native European populations, and questions of cultural identity by traditional majoritarian groups are all potential challenges at a European-wide level. Some issues, such as migration or questions relating to European Union may not be addressed for years to come, while nationalist and minority issues may soon be resolved as a matter of administrative policy, or shrink to regional concerns as states work independently to solve their problems. The important concern here is to note that while it may not be difficult to discern challenges facing these elites, the nature of the challenges will constantly be changing, with old challenges possibly resurfacing after time. Thus the role of administrative elites, regardless of the nature of state and social development doctrines, is of great importance for the prosperity of Europe in the 21st Century.

Notes

1. A number of scholars have studied the nature of elites, and ideas regarding their roles, positions, etc. are many. Max Weber's contribution to elite theory is the notion of Verstehen, or understanding. It was his belief that social events were caused by voluntary human actions, and not by the influences of social structure. Theda Skocpol, more of the structuralist school, believes that only after the study of the "institutionally determined situations and relations of groups within society" can one
make sense of the nature of elites. Vilfredo Pareto’s famous contribution to the analysis of elites was the notion of the “circulation of elites,” were groups of elites would replace one another within the institutional structures of society. See Farmer, chptr. 1 for a thorough overview of theoretical approaches. Other sources for theoretical approaches, in particular definitions of functionalism and structuralism, include Roy C. Macridis and Bernard E. Brown, Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1964); Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Comparative Politics Today: A World View, (Harp-Collins Publishers, 1992); and Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, The Politics of the Developing Areas, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960).

2. The classic-structural functionalist approach is concerned with asking the appropriate questions in social science research, most notably; What structures are involved? What functions have been performed? What functions take place within a given structure? This study does not look to exam the structures, nor does it try to identify the depth of function being performed. The assumption is made that the structures exist and within those structures are the delegated tasks of administrative elites. International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 7 (New York: MacMillan and the Free Press, 1968), p. 22.

3. There is little that is essentially different between the composition of administrative and bureaucratic elites. There is also little agreement as to exactly what each entails. Armstrong’s pithy statement is supported by Aberbach and company, while Farmer observes institutional differences, essentially revolving around the notion of power. For this study, administrative elites are understood to differ from bureaucratic elites primarily in the methods of recruitment, family origins, position within the institutional structures of a state, and the relative autonomy of elite positions. Armstrong, p. 6, Farmer, p. 7, Joel D. Aberbach, Robert D. Putnam, and Bert A. Rockman, Bureaucrats & Politicians in Western Democracies (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1981) pp. 84-85.

4. In no state of the 1992 programme survey did any of the participants list race as an imminent threat to the stability of their state or to that of Europe. Jacquemin and Wright, chapters 6-17.

5. Race is a separate issue area infrequently studied within a European context. Most racial associations are made with respect to nationalist, ethnic, or immigration issues. See Fascist Europe: The Rise of Racism and Xenophobia (London: Frank Cass & Company Ltd., 1994), edited by Glyn Ford.

Bibliography


